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China’s Approach to BR ICS1 
 
The economic rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) inevitably 
leads to a redistribution of power in the international system. 2 Chinese leaders today accord a 
considerable priority to this group, and there are elements of realism, liberalism/ 
institutionalism and constructivism in their approach. This article intends to study China’s 
policy towards BRICS and examine the above elements so as to better understand how the 
Chinese leadership perceives China’s role in the international system, and how it seeks to 
articulate its interests and enhances its influence. 
I. Introduction 
Jim O’Neill, economist of Goldman Sachs coined the BRICS term in 2001 to reflect the 
investment bank’s forecast that the combined GDPs of the four populous, fast-growing 
economies would surpass that of the Group of 7 countries by 2050.3 Political leaders 
apparently were attracted by the idea. It was then Russian President Vladimir Putin who 
initiated their first foreign ministers’ meeting alongside the United Nations annual General 
Assembly session in September 2006. After a repetition of the same exercise in the 
following September, the group agreed to establish a regular consultative process at the 
deputy foreign minister level. In 2008, the dialogue mechanism was raised to the foreign 
minister level, to discuss common approaches to international issues including the global 
financial crisis. The Russian foreign ministry claimed that the BRICS’ joint efforts to reform 
the world financial architecture was a factor prompting the G20 summit in Washington in 
November 2008 to expand the Financial Stability Forum (later renamed as the Financial 
Stability Board) to involve the emerging economies.4  
                                                          
1 BRICS refers to the group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa which only joined at the end 
of 2010. BRICs refers to the group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, and China only when the idea first emerged in 
early 2007. 
2 See the series of newspaper articles by Jim O’Neil: “The Brics Economies Must Help Form World Policy” Financial 
Times, 22 January 2007; “Why It Would Be Wrong to Write Off the Brics”, ibid., 5 January 2009; “You Can’t Build 
the Future Without BRICs,” The Daily Telegraph, 4 April 2009; and “We Need Brics to Build the World Economy,” 
The Times (London), 23 June 2009. At the Glenegales Summit in 2005, Western leaders agreed to hold a separate 
set of meetings with ministers from the emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, later 
known as the G8+5. Russia had already been invited to participate in the renamed G8. However, China was 
reluctant to join the club of rich countries. “Are the Right Countries Sitting at the G8 Table?” Deutsche Welle, 14 
May 2007. 
3 Demonic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global Economic 
Papers No. 99, New York: Goldman Sachs, October 2003. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the BRICs 
will surpass the G7 in 2021 in terms of their combined GDPs. 
4 Cynthia Roberts, “Challengers or Stakeholders? BRICS and the Liberal World Order”, Polity, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 
2010, P.2. 
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The BRICS heads of state met in July 2008 on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Japan 
again at Russia’s initiative; and this meeting led to a plan for a formal summit in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia in June 2009. In this first BRICS formal summit, the leaders focussed 
on the global financial crisis, the progress of the G20 summits, reform of international 
financial institutions, food security, climate change, as well as the prospects of the future 
dialogue and co-operation among members of the groups. 
By then, co-operation among the BRICS member countries had established a foundation 
through the mechanism of scheduled annual summits. Apparently they perceived the 
global financial crisis in 2008 – 2009 as a challenge and an opportunity promoting their co-
operation based on newly-recognized common interests. The Yekaterinburg Joint 
Declaration pledged co-operation in the coming G20 summit meeting to be held in 
Pittsburgh in the U.S. in the following September. The four countries proposed to 
enhance the influence and representativeness of emerging economies and developing 
counties in international financial institutions; and they strongly appealed for the 
establishment of a stable, predictable and more pluralistic international monetary 
system.5 
This article intends to examine how China has perceived its participation in the BRICS 
group from realist, liberal/ institutional and constructivist perspectives. Within this 
context, it attempts to analyze China’s role and objectives as a member of the group, as 
well as its assessment of the group’s development and achievements. 
II. The Realist Perspective 
Chinese leaders and foreign policy analysts often refer to Deng Xiaoping’s observation 
that peace and development are the most significant global issues in the present era. At 
this stage, globalization makes rapid progress; wars among major powers are less and less 
likely. In December 1977, Deng suggested that the world “can secure the delay of the 
outbreak of a world war”. In 1985, Deng reaffirmed that “it is possible” that a large-scale 
world war would not occur in a relatively long period of time, maintaining world peace is 
hopeful”. China’s independent foreign policy line of peace roughly emerged in 1982 – 83;6 
and with some adjustments, it has been maintained till now. Since 1979, Chinese leaders 
intend to focus on modernization and development, and they believe that China needs a 
peaceful international environment. 
                                                          
5 Cynthia Roberts, “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider”, ibid, pp. 38 – 73. 
6 See Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era: From Anti-Hegemony to 
Modernization Diplomacy”, in Joseph Y.S. Cheng (ed.), China: Modernization in the 1980s, Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1989, pp. 161 – 201. 
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China’s official view is that in the post-Cold War era, the international power configuration 
has become “one superpower and several major powers”. There has been no fundamental 
change up till today, and the U.S. remains the sole superpower. However, the global 
combat of terrorism and the international financial crisis in 2008 – 09 have weakened its 
predominance. In the eyes of Beijing, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been 
extremely costly, and the U.S. cannot secure decisive victory. Moreover, its faulty 
ideological orientation and strategy have damaged its soft power. The George Bush 
administration’s unilateralism and arrogance had led the country to relative isolation.7 
The recent international financial crisis has been a severe blow to the American and 
European economies. Chinese media argue that the crisis has cast serious doubt against 
the international financial architecture led by the U.S. The international community now 
demands reforms to enhance the representativeness and voting rights of developing 
countries in the international financial system.8 
At the same time, the respective influences of the European Union (EU) and the BRICS 
countries have been rising while that of the U.S. has been in decline. EU as a supranational 
organization has put into practice new thinking in international relations and in the 
shaping of a new international order, advocating new paradigms and reforms. Chinese 
leaders and media consider that the recent global financial crisis has pushed the BRICS 
groups to the centre of the international stage and it is expected to assume an important 
role in international governance mechanisms like the G20 alongside the leading 
developed countries. Together with other developing countries, the group will have an 
increasingly important role to play in international affairs.9 
There is a realistic recognition that China has a large population facing a lot of domestic 
challenges. It enjoys limited influence in the global agenda-setting and decision-making 
processes. It has to devote most of its resources to poverty alleviation, upgrading of 
industrial structure, improvement of the social security net, etc. hence China would like to 
enhance its role in international affairs through working within the BRICS group as their 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Li Shaojun, “大國關係與世界格局新變化 (The Relationship among the Major Powers and 
Changes in Global Patterns)”, in Li Shenming and Zhang Yuyan (eds.), 全球政治與安全報告 (2011) [Annual Report 
on International Politics and Security (2011)], Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2011, pp. 21 – 43. 
8 Liu Hong , “Economic Observation: Special Conference of G20 Under the Shadow of Financial Crisis”, Xinhuanet, 
October 11, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-10/12/content_10183161.htm; and Cui Zhinan and 
Xing Yue, “From the ‘Era of G7’ to the ‘Era of G20’ – Changes in International Financial Governance Mechanisms”, 
(World Economics and Politics), No. 1, 2011, pp. 134.  
9 “’金磚四國’合作: 我們時代的’亮點’ (BRICs Co-operation: the ‘Bright Spot’ of Our Era”, ChinaDaily Net, June 10, 
2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/2008-06/10/content_6750035.htm; and Wang Yizhou, “’金磚四國’ 共
謀未來志向 (BRICs Countries’ Jointly Plan Their Future Directions)”, 商周刊 (Business Weekly), June 22, 2009, pp. 
12 – 13. 
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members share similar interests in this regard. They still have many contradictions and 
conflicts of interests among them on a bilateral basis, but co-operation in international 
institutions may even serve to contain these bilateral conflicts. 
Chinese foreign policy experts consider that while the U.S. remains the sole superpower, 
the number of major powers has been rising, to the extent which facilitates the promotion 
of multilateralism and multipolarity. At the same time, the emerging economies occupy a 
more central role in the international stage, as they are eager to share power and 
responsibility. China would like to achieve its peaceful rise through these processes rather 
than directly confronting the U.S. and the other leading developed countries.10 
Within this international power configuration, Chinese leaders consider that wars among 
major powers or systemic wars would be highly unlikely. Major powers are in keen 
competition as well as interdependent. Co-operation among major powers becomes 
inseparable from the major developing countries and emerging economies. The latter’s 
increase in economic power will naturally have an impact on the international power 
configuration and the international system. The above world view helps to explain China’s 
rationale for its active participation in the BRICS group. 
In view of China’s rise, China’s foreign policy experts are acutely aware of the traditional 
international relations theorists of the realist school who argue that a rising power will 
bound to challenge the existing hegemon or the current international system and order, 
leading to major wars or systemic wars.11 Some Chinese international relations scholars 
now believe that the emerging major powers should instead be perceived as an 
opportunity. This is because significant changes have already been taking place in the 
international system. Though geostrategic competition continues, the survival of states in 
the international system is no longer their utmost concern. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the nature of security threats and security dilemma has been altered too. Hence, the 
emerging major powers can play an important role in the promotion of international 
peace and security. 
In this connection, Chinese leaders and their foreign policy think-tanks argue that the 
BRICS countries are in a similar stage of development and share broad interests. They are 
pre-occupied with their modernization and industrialization, as well as the raising of their 
people’s living standards. They would likely form a “coalition of interest”, i.e., adopting 
                                                          
10 “緒論: 和平與發展時代的大國關係 (Introduction: Major Power Relations in the Era of Peace and 
Development)”, in Qin Yaqing (ed.), 大國關係與中國外交 Dagui Guanxi yu Zhongguo Waijiao (Great Power 
Relations and China’s Diplomacy), Beijing: 世界知識出版社, 2011, pp. 1 – 29. 
11 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W.Nation, 2001; and Denny Roy (ed.), The 
New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
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similar stands on concrete issues based on common interests. They would not be bound 
by ideological positions, and form a bloc to overthrow the existing international order. The 
BRICS countries are not allies in the traditional sense, and cannot form a stable alliance, as 
there are serious conflicts of interests and keen competition among them. Their common 
interests in many global issues are the foundation for this “coalition of interests”, and the 
Copenhagen summit on climate change in 2009 is a good example.12 
Apparently Russia too, “the perennial outsider, aims to become an insider and a rule 
maker in the international system”.13 Cynthia Roberts considers that “Russia and the other 
BRICS seek to be among its (the international system’s) managing directors, not to 
overthrow it”; and she argues that “Moscow’s BRICS diplomacy has been one of its most 
successful international initiatives”.14 Chinese leaders have been careful to concede the 
initiatives regarding BRICS to Russia and other members, with the objective of enhancing 
co-operation within the group to contain the bilateral conflicts involving China. Marshall 
Goldman and Merle Goldman describe Sino-Russian relations as those between a young 
tiger and a wounded bear.15 Beijing has been eager to help to restore the Russian pride to 
enhance mutual trust for a stronger foundation for their comprehensive strategic 
partnership. While the Chinese leadership initiated the Shanghai Co-operation 
Organization, it has also been careful in respecting Russia’s vital interests to avoid 
damaging competition within the regional organization. 
The Chinese authorities have been adopting measures to strengthen Sino-Russian co-
operation. To avoid over-dependence on the imports of energy and other natural 
resources from Russia in the bilateral trade, China has been stepping up investment in 
Russia to promote trade diversification and technological co-operation. Both countries 
have been developing co-operation in the development of their border areas. In 2002, the 
Putin administration started the Far East development strategy, and released in 2007 a 
specific federal plan for the socio-economic development of the Far East and Trans-Baikal 
regions in the years to 2013. In 2003, the Hu Jintao administration initiated the strategy to 
rehabilitate China’s Northeast, i.e., its “rust belt”; and a formal plan was approved by the 
                                                          
12 Tan Mengsha, “金磚四國發展前景展望 (The Development Prospetcs of the BRICs Countries)”, 商品與質量 
(Commodity and Quality) No. 6, 2010, p. 30; and Yang Hongxi, “’金磚四國’冉冉升起又任重道遠 (‘BRICs Countries’ 
Gradually Rising with Heavy Responsibilities Ahead’)”, 學習期刊 (Study Monthly), No. 8 (first half month), 2009, 
pp. 41 – 42. 
13 Cynthia Roberts, “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider”, op. cit, pp. 38. 
14 Ibid.  
15 See Marshall Goldman and Merle Goldman, “Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, 
Issue 3, January 1988, pp. 551 – 573. 
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State Council in 2007. In 2009, the two governments engaged in the joint planning of the 
development of their respective border regions.16 
Sino-Indian relations are more problematic. The territorial issue remains unresolved; and 
their simultaneous rise in economic power and international influence has generated 
considerable suspicion and keen competition. In fact, it may be said that Sino-Indian co-
ordination or common position on global issues is probably the strongest link in their 
bilateral relationship. While Chinese leaders are concerned about the U.S. cultivation of 
India to contain China, they consider that co-operation within the BRICS group useful to 
limit the American approach to India. 
Similarly, Sino-Indian economic co-operation is constrained by their heavy dependence on 
the U.S. market, capital and technology; and Beijing believes that the U.S. would try to 
exert its influence to reduce the expansion in Sino-Indian economic exchanges.17 The 
Chinese authorities resent the investigations against their investment flows as well as the 
anti-damping sanctions against their exports; in fact the latter are second only to those 
from the U.S. in terms of the number of cases. The recent global financial crisis and the 
substantial surpluses secured by China in the bilateral trade have prompted India to adopt 
a series of trade protectionist measures. China hopes that the BRICS summits and other 
multilateral dialogues will facilitate India to open up its market to China, recognize its 
market economy status, and establish a free trade area between them.18 Despite the 
bilateral strategic co-operative partnership since 2005, there is still much work to be done 
to enhance mutual trust, and expand trade and co-operation in the energy sector. 
Brazil and South Africa are different from India and Russia in that they are quite distant 
from China, and therefore no historical conflicts, territorial disputes and security threats 
exist in their respective relations with China. Brazil is similar to India in their major power 
strategies, seeking to raise their global economic influence and the bargaining power of 
developing countries in general in order to secure a status equivalent to that of the leading 
developed countries. Since the Luiz Lula de Silva administration, Brazil has been 
enthusiastic in forming a nucleus group with India, China and South Africa to engage in 
                                                          
16 Chapter 12 “中俄關係 (Sino-Russian Relations)”, in Qin Yaqing (ed.), op. cit., p. 427. 
17 Lou Chunhao, “中印經貿合作面臨的新挑戰 (New Challenges Facing Sino-Indian Economic and Trade Co-
operation)”, 亞非縱橫 (Asia & Africa Review), Vol. 4, 2009, pp. 28 – 31, 58 – 60. 
18 Zhang Yuyan & Zhang Jingchun, “亞洲經濟一體化下的中印關係 (Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of Asia 
Economic Integration)”, 當代亞太 (Journal of Contemporary Asia Pacific Studies), Vol. 2, 2006, pp. 4 – 17; and 
chapter 13 “中印關係 (Sino-Indian Relations)” in Qin Yaqing (ed.), op. cit., pp. 446 - 447. 
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global trade negotiations including the Doha round; and together secure larger voting 
rights for them in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.19 
In a public opinion poll conducted by the Brazilian Centre for International Relations in 
2008, 92% of the respondents recognized China as “the most important country in terms 
of Brazil’s national interest”, ranking third after Argentina (95%) and the U.S. (94%).20 In 
the following year China replaced the U.S. as the number one trading partner of Brazil, a 
status enjoyed by the U.S. for more than seven decades. China emerged as the largest 
destination of Brazil’s exports and the second most important source of its imports. In the 
first half of 2010, China’s investment in Brazil jumped to US$ 12 billion, again replacing the 
U.S. as the leading investor country.21 This trend is expected to continue as Brazil needs 
capital to develop its natural resources and strengthen its infrastructure, it has been 
improving its domestic investment environment. China, on the other hand, has ample 
foreign exchange reserves exceeding US$ 3.3 trillion seeking investment outlets offering 
more satisfactory returns than U.S. Treasury bonds. 
While trade with China has been expanding and its trade surpluses are impressive, Sino-
Brazilian economic relations are not without problems. Brazil’s exports to China 
concentrate heavily on a small number of primary products, while imports from China 
present a serious threat to the local manufacturing industries. More significant still, China 
poses keen competition in Brazil’s important exports markets in terms of manufactured 
products. It is estimated that in the period 2001 to 2009, Brazil’s loss of markets to China 
in the U.S. and the European Union amounted to about US$ 2.5 billion; the actual loss 
would be higher because Brazilian exports to the U.S. and the European Union was about 
one-third of its total in 2009.22 It is not surprising that Brazil altogether initiated 46 anti-
dumping investigations against China from December 1989 to the end of 2009. Co-
operation within the BRICS group helps to emphasize common interests and contain 
these concerns and conflicts from Beijing’s point of view. 
South Africa was eager to join the BRICS groups, and China could claim credit for its 
admission in April 2011 at the third BRICS summit held in Sanya, China. The inclusion of 
South Africa, the largest economy in Africa and one of its most influential countries,  
                                                          
19 Zhou Zhiwei, “巴西崛起與中國對巴西政策分析 (Brazil’s Rise and An Analysis of China’s Brazil Policy)”, in Su 
Zhenxing (ed.), 中拉關係六十年: 回顧與思考 (下) (Six Decades of China – Latin American Relations: Reflections 
and Consideration, Vol. II, Beijing: Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2010, p. 524. 
20 Amaury de Souza, Brazil’s International Agenda Revisited: Perceptions of Brazilian Foreign Policy Community, 
Brasilia: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), 2008, p. 24. 
21 “中國投資巴西第一大國 (China Has Become Number One Investor Country in Brazil)”, Caijing Net, July 27, 
2010, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-07-27110486729.html.  
22 Rhys Jenkins, “China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2012, p. 42. 
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In US $  Million Table I. China's Trade with Other BRICS Countries (1991, 1996, 2001-2010)  
 Year  
China & Russia China & India China & Brazil China & South Africa 
Exports Imports Total  Exports Imports Total  Exports Imports Total  Exports Imports Total  
1991 1823.38 2080.87 3904.25 144.48 120.34 264.82 68.03 345.81 413.84 
  
  
1996 1692.71 5151.77 6844.48 686.02 719.17 1405.19 762.94 1484.08 2247.02 682.82 664.05 1346.87 
2001 2711.16 7959.38 10670.54 1896.27 1699.97 3596.24 1351.14 2347.34 3698.48 1049.12 1173.11 2222.23 
2006 15832.49 17554.33 33386.81 14581.30 10277.45 24858.75 7380.11 12909.50 20289.60 5767.71 4085.36 9853.07 
2007 28466.20 19688.58 48154.78 24011.46 14617.10 38628.56 11372.26 18341.83 29714.09 7428.26 6618.07 14046.33 
2008 33075.85 23832.76 56908.61 31585.38 20258.89 51844.27 18807.46 29863.44 48670.90 8617.62 9234.97 17852.59 
2009 17518.58 21232.96 38751.55 29656.04 13727.28 43383.32 14118.86 28276.92 42395.79 7365.75 8711.75 16077.50 
2010 29612.07 25921.04 55533.11 40914.96 20846.25 61761.20 24460.50 38125.38 62585.87 10799.86 14903.24 25703.10 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (comp.), China Statistical Yearbook (1992, 1997 and 2009 issues), Beijing: China Statistics  Press, 
1992, 1997 and 2009 
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(In US $ million) Table II.  Investment Flows Between China and Other BRICS Countries 
Year China's 
Investment in 
Russia 
Russia's 
Investment in 
China 
China's 
Investment in 
India 
India's 
Investment in 
China  
China's 
Investment in 
Brazil 
Brazil's 
Investment in 
China 
2000 NA 16.23 NA 10.44 NA 3.93 
2005 203.33 81.99 10 21.40 20 24.61 
2006 452.11 67.20 10 52.39 10 55.60 
2007 477.61 52.07 20 34.04 50 31.64 
2008 395.23 59.97 100 88.05 20 38.79 
2009 348.22 31.77 -30 55.20 120 52.48 
2010 567.22 34.97 50 49.31 490 57.25 
Year China's 
Investment in 
South Africa 
South Africa's 
Investment in 
China 
    
    2000  NA 9.19 
    2005 47.47 106.35 
    2006 40.74 94.81 
    2007 454.41 69.16 
    2008 4807.86 25.60 
    2009 41.59 41.20 
    2010 411.17 66.47 
     
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (comp.), China Statistical Yearbook (1992, 1997 and 2009 issues), Beijing: China Statistics 
Press, 1992, 1997 and 2009; 
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enhances the representativeness of the BRICS groups. Beijing would be glad that this 
would reduce the impact of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum which 
excludes China. In recent years, China’s trade and investment activities have been 
expanding rapidly in Africa; and in South Africa, it had replaced Germany as its largest 
source of imports. 
China’s African policy has been criticized by the West for having no strings attached to 
its economic ties with the continent, thus undermining the West’s demand for the 
improvement of governance, respect for human rights and the introduction of 
democracy in receiving its aid. China’s own economic activities in Africa have been 
perceived as colonial concentrating on the exploitation of natural resources, neglecting 
environmental protection, paying low salaries and ignoring the safety concerns of 
workers and miners, etc. When Chinese firms engage in infrastructural projects, they 
typically bring thousands of Chinese engineers, technicians and workers, thus 
depriving the locals of employment opportunities. Some Chinese workers stay behind, 
often entering into restaurant and retail business, sometimes resulting in a domination 
of these sectors in some regions. The flooding of the African market by Chinese 
manufactured products tends to discourage the development of local industries too.23 
The Chinese authorities understand that they have to improve China’s image in Africa, 
and joining hands with the South African leaders to fight for Third World interests is 
certainly in line with this objective while containing the bilateral conflicts mentioned 
above. 
III. The Liberal/ Institutional Perspective 
In April 1974, in the wake of the international oil crisis, Deng Xiaoping attended the 
special United Nations General Assembly meeting and strongly supported the Third 
World’s demand for the establishment of a new international economic order. 
Subsequently China demanded the establishment of a new international economic 
order and political order. The articulation of this demand has continued till now, 
though the voice has been muted in the past decade and more.24 
Since the international financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, the Chinese leadership 
has come up with a more integrated approach regarding building the new international 
order, based on previously articulated themes. Chinese leaders and their foreign policy 
think-tanks now consider that the international system and its institutions are 
inadequate in maintaining the international order. 
                                                          
23 Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Shi Huangao, “China’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol. 39, No. 1, February 2009, pp. 87 – 115. 
24 See Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era: From Anti-Hegemony to 
Modernization Diplomacy”, op. cit.; and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “China’s Foreign Policy after the Seventeenth Party 
Congress”, in Dennis Hickey and Baogang Guo (eds.), Dancing with the Dragon – China’s Emergence in the 
Developing World, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010, pp. 23 – 52. 
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In the first place, they have not been able to meet the development demands of the 
emerging countries and forces. In the post-Cold War era, a group of developing 
countries have rapidly emerged, together with important regional organizations and 
non-state actors. This phenomenon has become even more conspicuous in the recent 
global financial crisis; and the existing international governance structure has failed to 
cope with the emerging powers’ demand to consider and accommodate their interests. 
Moreover, the existing international institutions have not been able to co-ordinate the 
demands for global balanced socio-economic development. The gap between the rich 
and poor has been widening, and a number of developing countries are in difficulties. 
High-level of interactions between the international community and domestic 
societies have sharpened their developmental contradictions. Some countries have 
failed to adapt to the challenges of globalization, and problems of domestic 
governance have been exacerbated; this is why civil wars are more frequent than wars 
between states. Finally, the existing international order cannot deal with the important 
global issues like terrorism, environmental protection, climate change, etc. Countries 
now realize that they cannot independently resolve global issues, and opposing blocs 
such as those in the Cold War era cannot be formed. The Westphalian state system has 
proved to be increasingly inadequate. In sum, the existing international order lags 
behind the rising demands for global governance.25 
Though Chinese leaders have little tolerance for genuinely autonomous non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) within China, Chinese scholars are ready to admit 
that international NGOs assume an important role in agenda-setting and spreading 
norms.26 Many of them have been accorded an advisory capacity within the United 
Nations system and in other inter-governmental international organizations. 
Chinese foreign policy scholars argue that the inadequacies of existing international 
institutions and their reforms have made global governance an important aspect of 
politics among major powers, i.e., competition and co-operation governance 
institutions. In the post-Cold War era, wars among major powers or “high politics” have 
become much less likely; instead transnational challenges or non-traditional security 
issues have become more significant. Non-traditional security threats may originate 
from any part of the world, terrorism is a good example. Poverty is no longer a strictly 
domestic issue. It is the source of many other security threats, and it is highly related 
with violence, environmental deterioration and failed states.  
                                                          
25 “緒論: 和平與發展時代的大國關係 (Introduction: Major Power Relations in the Era of Peace and 
Development)”, in Qin Yaqing (ed.), loc. cit, 2011, pp. 14 – 18. For a Western view, see Colin I. Bradford, Jr. and 
Johannes F. Linn (eds.), Global Governance Reform: Breaking the Stalemate, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
26 Wang Yizhou, 創造性介入 – 中國外交新取向 (Creative Involvement – A New Direction in China’s 
Diplomacy), Beijing: Peking University Press, 2011, p. 46. 
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International governance is also an arena focusing interest contradictions among 
major powers. Though the latter are aware of the significance of the new non-
traditional security threats, their priorities differ according to their respective levels of 
development. Hence terrorism, poverty, environmental degradation, AIDS, nuclear 
weapons proliferation, etc. occupy different positions in various major powers’ 
development agendas. In the case of climate change, for example, major powers have 
different interpretations of their respective responsibilities. China’s think-tank 
researchers who articulate the above views are ready to admit that the EU member 
countries would like to see maximum progress and are willing to assume serious 
commitments; the U.S. is less concerned , but does not want to reveal its lack of 
willingness to make significant concessions; and the BRICS countries, on the other 
hand, resist on “ common but differentiated responsibilities”, it is impossible and 
unreasonable to expect them to substantially sacrifice their development interests. 
International NGOs have been recognized as a major force promoting new norms in 
this policy area.   
China’s foreign policy think-tanks argue that the BRICS group intends to maintain and 
reform the existing international order, and that it has no desire to destroy it.27 China 
as a member of this group naturally upholds this stand too. These think-tank 
researchers consider that effective international governance has to tackle the 
contradiction between the increasing demand for global governance and the 
inadequacies of existing international institutions in satisfying this demand. The 
Chinese authorities are ready to fully exploit the existing international institutions as 
well as establish new organization and mechanisms. In the coming two decades, the 
international community is expected to actively pursue reforms, transformations and 
innovations of international institutions, in order to minimize the institutional and 
governance deficits to raise the level of international governance; and major powers 
too will engage in co-operation and competition in these reforms, transformations and 
innovations. 
The Chinese authorities consider the G20 and its new role a meaningful development 
in international governance mechanisms; and the priority accorded to the BRICS is 
closely related to this.28 The most prominent characteristic of G20 is that it involves 
both the original major powers and the emerging ones, offering an important platform 
for their consultation and co-operation. It symbolizes the consensus on reforming the 
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global financial and economic architecture, and the progress in multipolarization in the 
international power configuration. Above all, Chinese foreign policy experts consider 
that the G20 summits represent the entry into the substantial stage of reforms of the 
international system. 
Chinese leaders advocate democracy and tolerance in intentional relations, although 
they do not practise it domestically. Their foreign policy think-tanks argue that co-
operation between major powers and emerging powers must be based on three 
conditions. In the first place, emerging power must be allowed to take part in the 
international institutional decision-making process, i.e., they must not be marginalized 
when the international financial crisis has ended. Co-operation involves the sharing of 
power and responsibilities, hence emerging powers must be given their due shares of 
power in the reform of the international system. 
Moreover, the legitimate interests and demands of the emerging powers must be 
respected. China considers that while emerging powers are experiencing rapid 
economic growth, their economic, social and political developments are still 
considerably below the levels of developed countries. Hence they cannot afford to 
meet the high standards set by the developed countries, for example, in the reduction 
of the release of “greenhouse gases”. Finally, the emerging powers’ request for 
consultation on an equal basis must be met, with regard to both procedural and 
substantial issues.29   
China identifies itself as an emerging power. Hence the demands of the latter are those 
of China too. To prevent its demands as those of the emerging powers or those of the 
BRICS group is obviously a more effective way of satisfying China’s demands. Chinese 
leaders believe in the country’s active participation in globalization especially 
economic globalization, although they are aware that the existing rules of the game 
have been defined by the U.S. and the Western countries without China’s participation. 
They are willing to accept the gradual reform of the rules of the game through 
exploiting the opportunities offered by the globalization process. 
Further, China needs a peaceful international environment to concentrate on 
modernization, hence it has a vested interest in the stable maintenance of the existing 
international order. In the era of economic reforms and opening to the external world 
since 1979, China has been engaging in a learning process to understand the existing 
international norms and to converge with them. Its foreign policy behaviour are more 
restricted by international law and norms, and it pays more attention to maintain its 
reputation of showing respect for international norms. Finally, in the recent decade or 
so, China openly claims to be a “responsible major power”, upholding the principles of 
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international justice and morality. It often refers to the example of refusing to devalue 
the renminbi during the Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997-8. The Chinese authorities 
also accord a high priority to develop the country’s soft power in recent years, of which 
a good international image is a major component.30 
As indicated above, the development of the BRICS group’s meeting mechanisms was 
much influenced by the emergence of the G20 summits as the international 
community’s response to the global financial tsunami breaking out in August 2008. 
The first BRICS finance ministers conference was held in Sao Paulo in Brazil on 
November 7, 2008, a week before the World Economic Summit in Washington, D.C.. 
The finance ministers appealed for reforms of the international financial architecture 
so that it could correctly reflect the new changes in the global economy, i.e., to ensure 
that developing countries would have a greater role to play in the international 
financial system. 
Four months afterwards, the second BRICS financial ministers conference was held in 
England, and a joint communiqué was released. The document stated that reforms of 
international financial institutions, including those of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, would be inevitable. Again, the four finance ministers sought a 
guarantee that developing countries would have a larger say and a higher status 
through these reforms.31 
The G20 summits have created an important platform for global economic policy co-
ordination and economic governance. In the eyes of China’s international relations 
experts, the global financial crisis highlighted the significance of global governance. In 
the wake of the crisis, global governance fundamentally broke the Western countries’ 
monopolistic control over major international institutions and the system of 
international governance. For the first time, major emerging developing countries 
enter the core of international governance, and they also serve as the core of regional 
governance in many cases.32 
In April 2010, in the spring annual conference of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, agreement was reached to increase developing countries’ voting 
rights by 3.13% to 47.19%. Since 2008, developed countries have transferred 4.59% of 
voting rights to developing countries. China has been a beneficiary; its voting rights 
have been raised from 2.77 %to 4.42 %, just behind the U.S. and Japan. Other BRICS 
member countries have similarly benefitted. 
                                                          
30 Joseph Y.S Cheng, “China’s Foreign Policy after the Seventeenth Party Congress”, op. cit. 
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32 Chapter 3 “金磚國家合作機制的興起與發展 (The Rise and Development of the BRICS Countries’ Co-
operation Mechanisms)”, in Qin Yaqing (ed.), op. cit., pp. 89 – 117. 
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In the following November, the International Monetary Fund approved its reform plan 
on the distribution of shares and voting rights. China’s shares rose from 3.72% to 
6.39%, and its voting rights from 3.65% to 6.07%, surpassing Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom, and after the U.S. and Japan only. Again other BRICS member 
countries improved their shared and voting rights too; for example, Brazil’s shares rose 
from 1.78% to 2.32%, rising its ranking from the fourteenth to the tenth. China was 
happy to see Seoul hosting the G20 summit in November 2010, the first time that an 
international economic summit was held in the capital of an emerging power.33 
The BRICS countries share similar interests in pursuing greater influence in 
international governance, and they perceive that co-operation as a group would 
considerably facilitate their pursuit. The above achievements have certainly 
strengthened this perception. 
Besides summit meetings and finance ministers meetings, the BRICs group also 
initiated security co-operation through security affairs senior representatives 
meetings. The first meeting was held in Moscow in May 2009, and the second meeting 
took place in Brasilia in April 2010.34 The forum remains not much more than a 
mechanism to exchange views and to generate a dialogue.  
IV. The Constructivist Perspective 
In order to enhance their influence in international institutions, BRICs member 
countries would like to establish a discourse representing the interests of developing 
countries so as to strengthen the legitimacy of their demands. 
On the basis of the two joint statements released after the BRICs summits in 2009 and 
2010, the group realized that its future development would focus on the economic and 
political arenas, promoting the development of multipolarization and democratization 
in international relations, co-operating to push for the recovery of the global economy, 
establishing a more rational new international economic order, and maintaining a just 
and rational global trade system. 
While China and Russia have long been articulating for a multipolar world, India, Brazil 
and South Africa too increasingly support multipolarity in seeking acceptance of their 
status as emerging powers. The establishment of a more democratic and just 
multipolar world, however, has a strong constructivist and idealistic element appealing 
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to small and medium-sized developing countries. Further, the BRICs group is ready to 
support strengthening the United Nations and upholding its significant role; India, Brail 
and South Africa are all eager for the permanent membership of the United Nations 
Security Council, with or without the veto power. 
The BRICs member countries are interested in multilateral diplomacy among 
themselves and in principle. More important still, they want a dialogue and 
cooperation with the developed Western countries on a genuinely equal basis, and 
would assume an active role in pursuing the interests of developing countries. In this 
way, the BRICs group argues that dialogue and co-operation among its members 
would be in accord with the common interests of emerging market economics and 
developing countries, they would also facilitate the building of a harmonious world of 
lasting peace and common prosperity.35 
In response to the global financial tsunami in 2008-9, the BRICs group emphasized the 
reform of the international financial system towards a more just, fair and rational 
direction. The group accorded priority to the following: a) strengthening the voice and 
representation of the emerging powers in international financial institutions; b) 
establishing a stable, predictable, and more pluralistic international monetary system; 
and c) resolutely opposing trade protectionism. 
China’s international relations experts believe that the economic development of the 
BRICs group and its deepening organizational co-operation would gradually arouse the 
concern and worry of the Western countries.  Under such circumstances, the latter on 
one hand actively invited the BRICs member countries to take part in co-ordination and 
consultation within the order framework dominated by them so as to absorb the BRICs 
member countries within the tracks defined by the West. On the other hand, Western 
countries would also adopt various measures to limit the adverse impact on them 
generated by the rise of the BRICs member countries.36 
These experts argue that the Western countries led by the U.S. plan to treat the BRICS 
member countries differently. Regarding China and Russia, it would be a combination 
of engagement and containment, a kind of hedging strategy. The U.S. and its allies 
would like to cultivate India, absorbing it into a U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral 
alliance; the U.S. has been offering India advanced weapons, and concluded with it a 
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nuclear energy co-operation agreement. The U.S. would hope to develop closer ties 
with Brazil and South Africa through co-operation and support in various areas. 
The Western world is perceived to attempt to expand its market share in the BRICS 
member countries, while trying to impose technical barriers to reduce imports from 
them. Its corporations would continue to exploit the developing countries’ cheap 
labour and natural resources, and attract their talents in the scientific and 
technological fields. China’s foreign policy think-tanks are concerned with the new 
legal limitations restricting the BRICS countries’ investment in the Western world. 
They consider that the developed countries have been strengthening their policy co-
ordination in handling the challenge from the emerging developing-powers like 
campaigns to discredit the image of products “made in China”.37 
These suspicious and criticisms against the Western world do not constitute part of the 
common discourse among the BRICS countries; and they seem to be much shared by 
China and Russia, but considerably less by the other three countries. However, these 
observations and criticisms often appear in China’s official media and academic 
publications, to some extent justifying China’s active participation in the BRICS group. 
China claims to have taken the initiative to invite South Africa to join the group in 
December 2010 and take part in the summit hosted by China in Sanya in April 2011. 
There were voices against the inclusion of South Africa because of its relatively weak 
comprehensive national power, but the Chinese leadership’s major consideration was 
the strengthening of the representativeness of the group to enhance the appeal of its 
discourse. The involvement of African countries through South Africa was thus a 
strategic step towards this goal.38 Mexico is perhaps the next target, though BRICS 
member countries understand that too rapid an expansion would only weaken this co-
ordination. 
The liberals within China’s foreign policy establishment argue that among major 
countries in the post-Cold War era, irrespective of their contradictions and differences, 
there is an understanding that war or all-out confrontation is not an option.39 Trade 
liberalization and increasing global economic interdependence are inevitable trends. In 
the case of China, the frequency of using military power in international disputes has 
been much reduced in the past three decades compared with the first three decades of 
the People’s Republic of China. The cultivation of China’s soft power therefore is a 
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most important consideration in its foreign policy. China’s active participation in the 
BRICS will enable Chinese leaders to develop a discourse articulating the interests of 
developing countries, especially those of the emerging powers, in shaping the evolving 
international institutional framework. 
Chinese leaders in the recent decade of so have been exploiting the traditions in 
ancient China’s foreign relations to enhance the credibility of its pursuit of a 
harmonious world.40 At the risk of over-simplification, Confucianism makes a 
distinction between wangdao (the moral way) and hegemonism. Wangdao emphasizes 
a universal moral order to justify the use of force when necessary, and in the exercise 
of influence in international relations, moral and political values come first, economic 
ties and rites are next in importance, while the use of military force is accorded a low 
priority. Hegemonism does not have the above considerations; it stresses the exercise 
of power and influence in the pursuit of actual benefits and status.41   
Applying the distinction to China’s foreign policy today, Chinese leaders and their 
think-tank experts appreciate the acute need to minimize the “China threat” 
perception, especially among its neighbours in view of China’s rise, its modernization 
of its military forces including the building of a blue-water navy, its increasing 
assertiveness in territorial disputes since 2010 or so, and its trade surpluses and 
investment activities abroad.  Further, China would like to convince the international 
community, especially the developing countries, that its rise would be beneficial to all 
mankind. The development of a discourse to justify and defend China’s pursuit of the 
international status and influence of a major power is essential to increase the 
international community’s acceptance and reduce its resistance, particularly that from 
the U.S. and the established major powers. Articulating the interests of the developing 
countries would facilitate China’s efforts to raise its influence in the existing and 
evolving international institutional framework; and BRICS in this context is a certainly a 
significant platform. 
The discourse theoretically has an important domestic function too. While domestic 
nationalist sentiments are steadily rising in China in the context of China’s impressive 
economic growth and improving international status, there often appears irresponsible 
statements in the domestic media and the Internet, demonstrating the potential 
influence of a narrow nationalism and big-power chauvinism. The past glory of ancient 
China and the humiliation in the century or so after the Opium War both contribute to 
the rising nationalism today, exerting considerable pressure on the Chinese leadership 
who must not be seen to be weak, especially in dealing with Japan and the U.S. 
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This popular nationalism lacks consideration of international public opinion, 
institutions and norms. It neglects the potentialities of settling international disputes 
through international law and normal diplomatic channels; as well as the sharing of an 
international order in which China will have a respectable and influential voice. It 
ignores the danger that in fighting hegemonism in international politics, China might 
be perceived as a rising hegemon or regional hegemon.42 The development of a 
constructivist discourse will help to contain the rise of nationalism in China. 
Chinese leaders today appreciate that China’s rising international status and influence 
constitute part of the foundation for their legitimacy; and the adoption of a liberal/ 
institutional and constructivist approach in China’s foreign policy is perhaps the only 
way to achieve the twin objectives of developing China’s soft power, enhancing China’s 
international status and influence, while containing the spread of nationalism 
domestically. Naturally, the Chinese leadership has to deliver results along the above 
line. China still has a relatively low per capita GDP by international standards; China’s 
expending foreign aid programmes and delivery of international public goods also 
need domestic justification. The Maoist line of internationalism used to provide that 
justification in the 1960s and 1970s; a new version is called for in the present context of 
emphasizing economic growth. The public controversy of delivering twenty-three 
buses to Macedonia while over-crowded school buses led to many domestic accidents 
is a good example.43 
V. Conclusion 
China’s approach to BRICS reveals its foreign policy considerations from the 
perspectives of realism, liberalism/institutionalism and constructivism. As reflected by 
China’s academic publications on the BRICS, China’s international relations experts 
consider that the group has emerged as a significant international actor. While 
international media tend to emphasize its economic potential and influence, China’s 
experts expect that the BRICS member countries would continue to deepen co-
operation and enhance their collective influence. There is a recognition that their co-
operation in the political and security arenas only stay at the level of principles at this 
stage, but there is an optimistic expectation in Beijing that concrete co-operation will 
come in the future; and that strengthening comprehensive co-operation will eventually 
lead to significant development of the group. 
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China’s experiences in the development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization 
(SCO) are relevant in two important aspects.44 The first is the institutional 
development in the form of meetings and committees in various areas involving 
political leaders and officials of different levels. Meanwhile, agreement on principles in 
international relations and major global issues like reform of the international financial 
architecture and climate change negotiations, hopefully, will facilitate the expansion of 
trade, investment and economic and technological co-operation among the BRICS 
member countries both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
In the evolution of the SCO, China has been carefully in deferring to Russian interests. 
China’s initiatives and influences must not be allowed to compromise Russia’s vital 
interests in Central Asia. China’s economic weight within the BRICS group ensures its 
leading role; and Chinese leaders have been wise to allow other BRICS member 
countries to pursue their initiatives. To some extent, India, Brazil and South Africa have 
developed better ties with developing countries and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) than China and Russia; and these ties, hopefully, would benefit 
the image and operations of the entire group. 
Like globalization, China’s participation in international governance has its benefits 
and costs. China has been increasingly active in assuming international obligations and 
delivering international public goods, thus improving its international image and 
status, enhancing its voice and influence in important global issues and the shaping of 
international institutions. At the same time, this higher-profile participation has 
generated new demands, and more monitoring and supervision by international 
media, international NGOs and international institutions. China needs to adjust its 
traditional low-profile and engage in better co-ordination among its domestic 
agencies. There are also domestic criticisms against the Chinese authorities’ “over 
generous” overseas aid commitments.45 
There is an obvious neglect of an important domestic-international linkage too. When 
Chinese leaders appeal for the democratization of international relations in various 
international forums, the international community cannot help noticing that there is 
not much democracy in China, in contrast to India, Brazil and South Africa. China’s lack 
of respect for human rights domestically tarnishes its international image and weakens 
its appeal for a harmonious world. Genuine political reforms in China are essential to 
China’s successful promotion of a harmonious world and a new international political 
order. 
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